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WHAT ONE CAN LEARN FROM FOREIGN-




There is much that could be said about the fascinating 
discovery by Professor Mulligan and her colleagues of the Dutch 
and German translations of the English text of the United States 
Constitution 1 drafted in Philadelphia in 1787. But, of course, that 
draft consisted only of proposals; what was key was the 
transmission shortly afterward to the citizenry at large for what 
the first Federalist aptly described as their "reflection and 
choice" 2 about the new system proposed to replace what its 
critics called the "imbecility"3 of the polity established by the 
Articles of Confederation. There are at least three different 
perspectives from which one can mount one's own analysis of 
the non-English language texts that are the subject of this essay.4 
First, one might simply look at their work- and, 
particularly, the extremely interesting Appendix containing the 
actual translations-from what might be termed a "micro-
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, 
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at 
Austin. As always, I am grateful to Jack Balkin for his comments on an earlier draft. I 
also appreciate Jill Hasday's invitation to contrihute to this discussion. 
I. Christina Mulligan, Michael Douma, Hans Lind & Brian Quinn, Founding Era 
Translations ofthe Federal Constitution, 31 CoNST. COMMENT. I (2015). 
2. FEDERALIST NO. I (Alexander Hamilton). See also SANH)RD LIVINSON, AN 
ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING TJ/1~' FI~'J>I~'IU\USf'IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2015). 
3. See, e.g., FEDERALIST No. l.S (Alexander Hamilton). 
4. Although I initially typed "foreign language," it is, I think, essential to realize 
that there is a very powerful, and perhaps untenahlc, assumption huilt into the 
description of Dutch and German as "foreign language." As noted in the text, there were 
many "good Americans" circa 17X7 for whom English was not their primary language, 
contrary to Puhlius's assertions in Federalist 2. That English has turned out to he the 
dominant language within the United States was perhaps predictahk, hut it surely was 
not legally re4uired. 
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perspective." We could concentrate on the subtle differences in 
meaning that might be generated by the shift from English to 
Dutch or German (and then back again into English by virtue of 
translating from the Dutch or German). I well remember my 
own experiment in this direction many years ago, when I asked a 
law student at the University of Texas, who had been a 
professional translator prior to his coming to law school, to 
translate one of the commonly available French versions of the 
U.S. Constitution without, of course, referring to the English 
• 'i 
version. 
A second possibility is to address some of the theoretical 
issues posed by the notion of "translation" itself, particularly 
with regard to the basis by which we assess the merits of any 
given translation. Even those who are, unlike me, multilingual, 
must nonetheless rely on translations much of the time in a 
world whose multicultural reality becomes ever more important. 
Almost by definition, we are at the tender rnercies of the 
translator, the accuracy of whose work we really cannot truly 
judge. A final perspective is provided by what might be termed 
the "social history" aspect of their project, which emphasizes the 
social and political reality, and presumed importance, of the 
existence of German- and Dutch-speaking minorities in 
Pennsylvania and New York at the time of the Constitution's 
proposal and ratification. The United States was already a 
"multi-cultural' or "multi-national" country, which raises 
interesting questions with regard to at least some of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the new nation taking form 
following the secession from the British Empire. The reality of 
such multiculturalism-especially when revealed in the presence 
of languages other than English- has often generated either 
denial or, when that is, as a practical matter, impossible, then 
normative opposition. We will see at least the first reflected in 
one of the most interesting essays of The Federalist and the latter 
in the thought, interestingly enough, of one of our most 
cosmopolitan "founders," Benjamin Franklin. I will discuss these 
three perspectives in turn. 
5. I am emharrassed to say that although I recall that it was very illuminating al 
the lime lo sec what difference it might make if, in some hypothcticcd future, historians 
trying lo reconstruct the U.S. Constitution had only a French-language text from which 
lo work. I do not remcmhcr the specifics and was unahlc to find the translation in my 
files. C'cslla vic! 
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II. ON THE MICROANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE 
Although this project may have interesting implications for 
"originalists," explored in the accompanying essay by my friend 
Jack Balkin, it also is of obvious relevance to those who describe 
themselves as "textualists." For example, does it matter-or, 
perhaps more to the point, exactly how and why does it matter-
if instead of the words "to keep and bear arms" in the Second 
Amendment, we instead read only the words "to carry arms"?6 
This, of course, is not the only potentially interesting example 
found in a careful perusal of the Appendix. Consider the 
German translation of the "territories clause" of Article IV as 
ostensibly giving Congress "the power to sell the land or other 
property of the United States and for this to make the necessary 
rules/orders and establishments"?7 "[F]or this" seems to limit 
congressional power of rule-making to a small subset of cases in 
which the land is being sold either to private purchasers or, 
perhaps, to a foreign country. To be sure, this raises a host of 
questions: Is it really conceivable that Congress is without 
power, say, to pass laws· organizing new territories that are 
acquired by war or treaty or even the territories that are carved 
out of existing states like Virginia or New York? Still, those who 
profess to be serious textualists, like Justice Scalia or Harvard 
Law Professor John Manning, often argue that they (or we more 
generally) are bound by the dictionary meanings of language and 
that we ought not to infer broader "purposes" that in effect 
license judges and other interpreters simply to do whatever they 
desire.~ 
These, of course, are not the only examples of interesting 
problems that are generated by carefully reading the alternatives 
presented by retranslating the German and Dutch back into 
English. One might have a different conception of the Vice 
President-whose office I have elsewhere analogized to the 
duck-billed platypus because of the difficulty in assigning it to a 
single species 9 - if we accept, with regard to the limitation that 
6. Mulligan, supra note I, at app., p. 56 (German translation). 
7. !d. at 50. 
X. See, e.g., Scalia's opinions in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 24XO, 2496-507 (2015); 
NI~RB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 257X-61X (2014). See John F. Manning, The 
Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 
(2004). 
l). See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS 
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"[N]o Person holding any office" can "during his Continuance in 
office" be at the same time a member of the House or Senate, 
the proviso that the person in question must be someone who 
"administers any office." 10 What "office" does the Vice President 
"administer[]"? Is any official within the entire Executive 
Branch, for example, under a duty to accept orders from the 
Vice President? Contrast the Vice President not only with the 
President- the Commander-in-Chief, after all- but also with the 
Secretary of Transportation or even the Deputy Undersecretary 
of the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of the 
Interior. The sole duty of the Vice President, according to the 
Constitution, is to be President of the Senate. The fact that 
contemporary presidents may assign their vice-presidents certain 
duties to chair committees or the like, arguably does not 
translate into "administer[ing]" an office, unless we want to 
argue that anyone who, say, hires a secretary or scheduler comes 
within the Disqualification Clause. But is that a sensible reading 
of the phrase? 
Similarly, consider what difference it might 1nake, with 
regard to the kinds of "germaneness" or "single--subject" rules 
sometimes found in state constitutions and their structuring of 
the legislative process, if Article I, Section 7 defined 
"Amendments" as limited to "Improvements" or 
"Corrections." 11 We have become used to the fact that the 
Senate, especially, often proposes decidedly non-germane 
amendments to bills that originate in the House. If we knew only 
of the German translation, perhaps we would realize that all of 
them are unconstitutional. Among other things, this would 
presumably save us from the modern phenomenon of "omnibus 
legislation," joining together in ungainly fashion hundreds of 
pages relating to significantly different issues that a president is 
forced to sign or veto in toto. Finally, consider the implications 
of translating "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
"what the situation demands," 12 especially if we view that as a 
AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 22X (20I2). 
IO. Mulligan, supra note I, at app., p. I4 (German translation). 
II. !d. at app., p. IS (German translation). 
I2. !d. at app., p. 2o (German translation). Though sec as well the commentary to 
the Dutch translation. where the translation for "proper" ("hcquaam" in lXth century 
Dutch spelling), means, in rctranslation, "competent, able, or capable." !d. Thus, "I f]or a 
law to he 'noodig en hcquaam,' it would have to be necessary and c<tpable of achieving 
the end it sought." !d. 
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proper subject for judicial scrutiny. It is still not clear how that 
differs from "necessary," unless, of course, one translates 
"necessary" as Marshall did in McCulloch v. Maryland, to mean 
"useful." 13 In that case, it might make sense, as the authors 
suggest, to view the German text as on to something in 
"emphasiz[ing] that the power given is essentially restricted" by 
the requirement that the objective situation, presumably open to 
judicial review, "demands" the controversial measure. 
All of these points are presumably interesting to anyone 
who takes constitutional language with extreme seriousness, 
including placing the language in a purportedly rigid historical 
context. Those of us who are not sympathetic with the radical 
rejection of purposivism -or embrace of originalism- found in 
at least some iterations of textual argument as adopted in certain 
opinions by Justice Scalia 14 or Chief Justice Roberts, 1:i though, 
can wonder if anything would truly be different had all English-
language texts disappeared on November 1, 1787, and we had 
been forced to reconstruct the Philadelphians' handiwork by 
translating the texts back from Dutch and German into English. 
The only plausible response, obviously, is that we'll never know. 
This is counter-factual history of truly science-fiction proportion. 
Still, it would be interesting to know how those far more 
sympathetic than I to originalism would respond to these 
discoveries. 
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17U.S. 316,356 (lXlY). 
14. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 24XO, 2505 (2015) ("The Court's decision 
rclkcts the philosophy that judges should endure whatever intcrprt:tivc distortions it 
takes in order to correct a supposed flaw in the statutory machinery"). 
15. See, e.g., Chief Justice Rohcrts' dissent in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
/ndep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677-Y2 (2015). Rohcrts, of course, had 
written the majority opinion in Burwell, so it is fair to say that Rohcrts either has a more 
nuanced (or incoherent) view of the power of textual commands than docs Scalia. 
Though perhaps I should emphasize that I am a "hard-core textualist" with regard to 
what I have taken to calling "the Constitution of Settlement" that is, alas, almost never 
really taught within the legal academy precisely hecausc no interesting issues of 
"interpretation" seem to he involved. On the dillcrencc hetwecn the "Constitution of 
Conversation" and "Constitution of Settlement," See LEVINSON, supra, note Y, at lY. My 
own stock example is Presidential Inauguration Day, whose deferral until January 20 I 
think to he unfortunate and even at times dangerous, hut is, nonetheless, impervious to 
clever lawyerly argument that a discredited incumhent is under the duty to make way for 
his successor prior to that time. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX. 
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III. ON ASSESSING TRANSLATION 
Part of what is both interesting and amusing about this 
project is precisely that we have the original English-language 
texts by our sides, and we can use our presumed skill in that 
language in assessing, or at least offering thoughtful 
commentary, on the German or Dutch (or any other language, 
presumably) versions. But this reality points to an important 
theoretical issue with regard to the enterprise of '"translation" 
and, more to the point, to our ability to assess the accuracy or 
validity of any given proffered translation. Consider in this 
context the arguments made by Larry Lessig that we should view 
American constitutional law in general as a process of 
"translation" from "original understandings" to later 
understandings that pay due heed to changed circumstances. 16 
The obvious problem is how we assess any given "translation." 
How do we decide, for example, if the "New Deal Settlement" 
represents the best way, in the 20th century, of reading the 
Commerce Clause or, instead, represents what Ballkin and I have 
described in a different context as "judges on a rampage" who 
willfully ignore the limits of the text in favor of their own 
political preferences? 17 As I put it some years ago, who actually 
"needs" translations, with what implications? 1x The answer is 
someone who has no access to an "original text," either because 
it no longer exists or because the person seeking the translation 
simply is incompetent to read and understand the original. 1l) 
One can evaluate a given "translation," at least as to 
"reliability" (as distinguished, say, from its stylistic appeal to 
contemporary readers) if and only if there both exists a copy of 
some authoritative ur-text to which we can refer and the person 
assessing a given translation has sufficient facility in decoding 
the meaning of the original text to be able to say that the later 
interpreter was or was not faithful to its "true meaning." But if 
all of the English-language texts of the Constitution disappeared, 
16. See, e.g., Lawn.:nce Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tr:x. L. RFV. 1165 (1YY3). 
17. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of /,ooking at Dred Scott, 
X2 CIII.-KENT L. REV. 4lJ, 7X-7Y (2007). 
1 X. See Sanford Levinson, Translation: Who Needs It?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1457 
(1lJlJ7). 
1lJ. Jill Hasday has suggested that even someone competent in a foreign language 
might nonetheless he interested in a translation partly to sec what another competent 
reader said and partly, perhaps, in the hope that the alternative translation will prove 
more felicitous with regard to how one hopes to interpret the text in question. 
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for example, we would simply have no way of knowing whether 
the German or Dutch versions were faithful to the original or 
not. It would be like debates on the internal physiology of the 
unicorn. There is simply no way of deciding whether unicorns 
are ruminants or not. 
Similarly, and just as importantly, if I myself cannot read 
Dutch or German, as is most certainly the case, I have no basis 
for praising or criticizing any "retranslation' of the Constitution 
from one of those languages back into English. The phrase "it's 
all Greek to me" presumably captures the sense of alienation 
when looking at an alphabet that one cannot decode, let alone 
the complex sentences built out of the strange looking phis, psis, 
and omegas. I am a big fan of the Iliad, which I believe should be 
read by every literate person. There are, needless to say, literally 
dozens of competing translations; the first, by George Chapman, 
provoked one of the most famous poems in the English 
language. 20 Nearer our own time, the reader can pick from well-
reviewed versions by Robert Fagles, Richard Lattimore, Robert 
Fitzgerald, and Stephen Mitchell, to name only four among 
many others. 21 I have my own preferences, based in part of the 
accessibility of the English text to a modern reader and the sheer 
flow of the narrative. And some versions are more self-
consciously "poetic" than others. One reviewer writes of a 1987 
translation by Martin Hammond that "[i]f I couldn't stand to 
read another line of poetry but wanted to refresh my memory of 
the story, Hammond's version would be my choice." 22 What I 
simply cannot do, though, is say that one of them is a more 
"faithful rendering" of Homer than another. How in the world 
would I know? The reason I rely on the translation is precisely 
that I am illiterate in the original Greek (or, if truth be known, in 
any other non-English language). One can, of course, look at 
20. See John Keats, On First Looking into Chapman's Homer, POETRY 
FotJNDATION, http://www.podryfoumlation.org/pocm/173746. 
21. For comments ahout various translations, sec Douglas HofstaJtcr, What's 
Gained in Translation, N.Y. Times Book Rev. (Dec. X, 1<.JY6), 
https://www.nytimcs.com/hooksN7/07/20/rcvicws/hofstaJtcr-translati(m.html. See also 
Daniel McnJclsohn, Englishing the Iliad: Grading Four Rival Translations, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 31, 2011 ), http://www.ncwyorkcr.com/hooks/pagc-turncr/cnglishing-thc-
iliaJ-graJing-four-rival-translations. 
22. Eric McMillan, The continuing story of Akhil!eus, EDITOR ERIC'S GREATEST 
LITERATURE OF ALL TIME: THE WORKS (2013), http://www.cJitorcric.com/grcatlit/ 
translations/lliaJ.html. 
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translations heuristically; no doubt readers fluent in Russian or 
French may still be interested in translations of Tolstoy or 
Proust, but, at the end of the day, they are in no serious sense 
"relying" on them in the same way that I must. And, of course, a 
common occurrence is that these fluent readers will spend most 
of their time registering complaints about the inept translations 
foisted upon them! 
So the importance of the materials uncovered by Professor 
Mulligan and her colleagues, however interesting, is decidedly 
different from what it would be if, say, they had discovered the 
Greek or Latin text of a hitherto unknown (or lost in antiquity) 
Assyrian constitution, where there is simply no "original" 
against which to measure the purported translation. Moreover, it 
is probably worth adding, the almost certain commitments of 
contemporary readers to particular interpretations of the 
English-language constitution with which we are all familiar 
makes it particularly unlikely that we would be budged by 
whatever the Germans and Dutch translators (and then re-
translators) had come up with. This is an "acadernic project" in 
both the positive and somewhat pejorative senses of that term, 
almost certainly unlikely to interest anyone not a practicing 
academic. 
IV. AMERICA AS A MULTI-LINGUAL SOCIETY 
But enough of linguistic theory. Frankly, what I find most 
truly important about these translations is their putting the lie to 
a central aspect of one version America's founding myth. Begin 
with the Declaration of Independence and its assertion that 
there exists in British North America "one people" who can 
secede from the British Empire and come together collectively 
to exercise self-government as The United States of America. As 
a matter of fact, one might say that the Articles of Confederation 
themselves put the lie to that assertion insofar as the new 
government was so weak, with "sovereign'' power specified to be 
retained, by and large, in the constituent states. The amendment 
rule set out in Article XIII, by requiring unanimity, also 
underscored the extent to which it was indeed a confederation, 
that is, a limited-purpose coming together of "sovereign" states 
for specific purposes. Think of NATO or NAFf A in today's 
world (or, perhaps, depending on one's degree of pessimism, the 
European Union). 
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The Constitution drafted in 1787 was something quite 
different. It also spoke in the name of "We the People'' and, as 
its opponents correctly pointed out, established a "consolidated" 
system somewhat misleadingly described as "federal" that in fact 
created an almost astonishingly more powerful national 
government, with nary a mention in the text of anything about 
"sovereign states." Indeed, Article V underscored the extent to 
which a minority of states would have no choice at all about 
accepting amendments that were accepted by three-quarters of 
the states. No longer, as under the Articles, would a single state 
(or even several states, so long as they were less than lA+ 1) be 
able to veto changes thought desirable by three quarters of their 
fellow members of the Union. 
Why should one accept this new constitutional order? 
Publius devoted The Federalist to exactly that question. And 
Federalist 2 (written, for what it is worth, by John Jay) provided 
a powerful answer: 
It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent 
America was not composed of detached and distant 
territories, hut that one connected, fertile, widespreading 
country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. 
Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety 
of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable 
streams for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. 
A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round 
its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble 
rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present 
them with highways for the easy communication of friendly 
aids and the mutual transportation and exchange of their 
various commodities. 23 
Perhaps one finds this bucolic image persuasive. Surely I am not 
the only person who has noted the dramatic difference in 
landscape if one is flying over the eastern United States rather 
than, say, travelling from Texas to Oregon. Such mountains as 
exist east of the Mississippi are almost friendly, beckoning to the 
traveler with their copious trees that extend to the very tops of 
the mountains. No one who has seen the Rockies, let alone the 
Alps, would confuse them with the Appalachians. And it is 
surely unjust to expect Publius to be aware of the post-Louisiana 
Purchase topography of the United States, when the distinctly 
n. FEDERALIST No.2 a to (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter cd., I Y61 ). 
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more forbidding Rocky Mountains will become part of the 
American landscape. But then we come to his next paragraph, 
about which we can and should be less generous: 
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that 
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected 
country to one united people-a people descended from the 
same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the 
same religion, attached to the same principles of government, 
very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their 
joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side 
throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established 
general liberty and independence (emphasis added). 24 
This entire sentence is preposterous, though I have emphasized 
only the clause of greatest relevance to the project that is our 
topic. After all, we are told very early on, by way of explaining 
the existence of these very interesting translations, that in late 
September 1787, "'around 1/3 of the population of Pennsylvania 
primarily spoke German." 25 Similarly, "in the late 1700s, the 
Dutch language was still spoken widely in New York, specifically 
in the rural areas around New York City .... " 2(1 Surely Publius 
was aware of this; if we drop the nom de plume and ask about 
the historical figure John Jay, it defies belief that this son of New 
York was unfamiliar with the presence of Dutch speakers. One 
might not be surprised if he were ignorant, for example, of the 
fact that Georgia was settled not only by Englishman, but also by 
"Welsh, Scots Highlanders, Germans, Italians, Piedmontese, and 
Swiss," 27 at least some of whom, for all I know, might have 
continued to speak their native languages even while considering 
the merits of the newly proposed Constitution. But it would be 
astonishing if he were unaware of basic aspects of New York 
social reality and, to say the least, also more than somewhat 
surprising if he were ignorant of Benjamin Franklin's decided 
unhappiness at the multitude of German speakers 1n 
P I . 2i' ennsy vama. 
24. /d. 
25. Mulligan, supra note I, at 4. 
26. /d. 
27. INFOPI"EASI , Georgia, http://www.infoplcase.com/encydopcdia/us/gcorgia-
statc-unitcd-states-history.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2015). 
2K. '"Few of their children in the country learn English,"' Franklin complained. 
"'The signs in our streets have inscriptions in hoth languages ... Unless the stream of 
their importation could he turned they will soon so outnumher us that all the advantages 
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The United States Constitution refrains from adopting an 
"official language," but Franklin for one might have been much 
happier if we had emulated the French in adopting one. Why 
didn't we? One possibility is that it was quite clear that English 
would dominate the economic and social marketplace and would 
inevitably win out in any competition. So why ruffle feathers by 
underscoring this reality and in effect officially marginalizing a 
fairly sizable number of one's fellow citizens, whose votes one 
would need for the project of ratification, by labeling "un-
American" their native language? Another possibility, of course, 
is that one might find this linguistic pluralism, like other aspects 
of our pluralism that 1 ay seems eager to ignore in Federalist 2, to 
be a positive advantage, a feature and not a bug, in 
contemporary parlance. In any event, it should be clear that the 
notion of a singular American "people" defined in terms other 
than the sheer contingency that they live within a geographically 
bounded territory, was then, and remains today, a subject of 
debate. 2l) 
No one familiar with the full panoply of the RS essays that 
compromise The Federalist could possibly believe that Publius 
always speaks in a consistent voice. And this would no doubt be 
true even were Publius in fact a single person; it is no easy 
matter to maintain consistency even in a single essay (or judicial 
opinion), let alone over a wide array written at different times 
and, in the case of both Federalist essays and judicial opinions, 
responding to different concrete realities with regard to the 
audiences one hopes to reach. 
So the question becomes why did 1 ay feel it incumbent to 
offer such a demonstrably wrong portrait of the "people" in 
whose name the Constitution was ordained? In many ways, the 
we have will not he able to preserve our language, and even our government will become 
precarious."' Quoted in Kenneth Davis, The Founding Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 
2007, htlp://www.nytimcs.com/2007/07/03/opinion/03davis.html. Or, as he put it in his 
"Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind," htlp://www.archivc.org/strcam/ 
incrcascmankindOOfranrich/incrcascmankindOot'ranrich_djvu.txt, "why should the 
Palatine Boors he suffered to swarm into our scllkmcnts, and hy herding together 
establish their languages and manners to the exclusion of ours? Why should 
Pennsylvania, founded hy the English, become a colony of Aliens, who will shortly he so 
numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our 
language or customs, any more than they can acquire our complexion?" 
29. See, e.g., BERNARDY ACK, NATIONALISM AND THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
COMMUNITY (2012). 
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answer may really be quite simple: Whatever may be the reality 
of 21st century American politics and culture, he clearly believed 
there was nothing to be gained by underscoring the extent to 
which we were, even then, distinctly multi-cultural and -national, 
with attendant challenges for a polity that claimed to consist of 
only "one people." The political philosopher most often cited in 
The Federalist is not John Locke, but, rather, Montesquieu. To 
be sure, many of the citations have to do with his views on the 
importance of separation of powers, but it is also the case that 
the French philosopher was both a source and a foil for Publian 
ideas. After all, he is very well known as a philosopher of 
republican government- which, of course, the Constitution 
guarantees to each state in Article IV and, one presumes, is the 
motif of the overarching constitutional order itself. What are the 
preconditions for republican governance? A.ccording to 
Montesquieu, they are, basically, the size and the hon1ogeneity of 
the polity. That is, a republic should be relatively small; part of 
the reason is that it should also be relatively homogeneous, 
consisting indeed of a singular people comrnitted to self-
government. 
It is obvious that no defender of the Constitution could 
possibly accept the strictures on size; both Madison and 
Hamilton, in several of their Publian essays, explicitly defend 
what has come to be called the "extended republic." 30 But Jay 
seems to be accepting the argument that even if extension is 
possible, it will be successful only if homogeneity remains. That, 
after all, is just what it means to be "one united people," and he 
goes on to spell out, albeit misleadingly, all of the ways that we 
are united. To accept that a country extending, in 1787, from 
what is now Maine to the southern border of Georgia and then 
west to the eastern bank of the Mississippi was in fundamental 
respects not united around anything other than an abstract 
commitment to the Constitution, Jay may well have believed, 
would be to condemn the entire consolidationist enterprise. 
After all, as the anti-Federalist Agrippa wrote on December 3, 
1787, "It is impossible for one code of laws to suit Georgia and 
Massachusetts .... The idea of an uncompounded republic, on 
an average one thousand miles in length, and eight hundred in 
]0. See FEDERALIST No. li (Alexander Hamilton); FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 14 
(James Madison). 
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width~ and containing six millions of white inhabitants~ all 
reduced to the same standard of morals~ or habits~ and of laws~ is 
itself an absurdity." 31 
What would reduce the absurdity is to claim exactly what 
Publius/Jay did in Federalist 2. Perhaps one wants to argue that 
the differences in language are in fact relatively unimportant. 
Perhaps that is true~ in comparison~ say~ to the differences in 
religious beliefs and commitments that Publius also freely 
ignores in his zeal to describe a homogeneous people (who will 
presumably be eager to support a consolidated national 
government). Thus~ we discover that even the Dutch community 
in New York was divided into "two warring factions within the 
Reformed Church~" though it is unclear whether the wars over 
church doctrine translated into substantive political views on the 
merits of the new Constitution. The central point, though~ is that 
the Publius of Federalist 2 was basically in deathly fear of 
heterogeneity. It is hard to know which is worse, the prospect 
that he was actively lying~ i.e.~ saying things that he knew to be 
untrue~ or~ instead~ that his fears generated a massive case of 
denial. 
However~ as already suggested~ what is fascinating about the 
various essays of Publius is that one can find alternative views of 
homogeneity and heterogeneity~ so that the "extended republic" 
is not simply larger than the Italian city states or Geneva~ but 
also blessedly more heterogeneous. Is this not the principal 
theme of what is probably the best known essay, Federalist 10~ in 
which Publius/Madison expresses extremely deep fears about the 
political sociology of small states~ including his own state of 
Virginia? That is~ it turns out to be the case that no state~ 
however small~ is truly homogeneous. They are all divided by 
reference to a number of different factors, and these inevitable 
differences~ "sown in the nature of man~" according to Publius~ 
constitute the "latent causes of faction" that so concern him. 32 
Factions, which he defines as the propensity to prefer one's own 
interest over the common good, can be seen "everywhere~" 
31. Agrippa, quoted in JAMES MCCLELLAN, LIBERTY, ORDER, AND JUSTICE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 01· AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 
(1l.lXl.l),h ttp://oll .li bert yfund.org/ti tks/mcck llan-li bert y-ordcr-a nd-j ustice '! q= It+ is+ 
impossihk+f<lr+one+code+of+laws+t<Hsuit+Georgia+and+Massachusetts#McCkllan_OO 
XX_132n. 
32. FEDERALIST No. 10 at 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1% I). 
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brought into different degrees of activity, according to the 
different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different 
opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and 
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an 
attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for 
pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions 
whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, 
have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them 
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more 
disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co--operate for 
their common good .... But the most common and durable 
source of factions has been the various and unequal 
distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are 
without property have ever formed distinct interests in 
. ]] SOCiety. 
As is well known, Publius sees no way of eliminating faction 
without eliminating liberty itself. However, the consequences 
can be limited precisely by accepting the exte1t1ded republic, 
which has the virtue of weakening the power of any given faction 
by creating a national political context within which a 
multiplicity of factions must contend with one another. Unlike 
the case in Virginia or any other state, no faction can genuinely 
hope to establish supremacy; all must seek out alliances and 
make compromises with groups they would prefer to crush if the 
situation allowed. 
Interestingly enough, Publius in Federalist 10 makes no 
mention at all of the degree to which factions can organize 
around language, though anyone familiar with politics today is 
fully cognizant of the extent in many countries around the world 
that linguistic issues are at least as important as some of the 
other "sources of faction" that are outlined. We have not 
escaped such tensions ourselves, of course; "English-only" 
movements have been a staple of American politics at least for 
most of the past half-century. As if corroborating the analysis set 
out in Federalist 10, devotees of linguistic exclusivity have been 
able to capture control of certain localities and even states, even 
as federal law has seemingly taken greater cognizance of the fact 
that English is only one of the languages spoken or understood 
by "genuine Americans." Thus, a contemporary analogue of the 
translations of the Constitution into German and Dutch may be 
33. /d. 
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the preparation of voting materials in Spanish or Chinese, for 
example, in certain parts of the country. But the recognition that 
English is not our official language of government continues to 
raise the hackles of some observers. Louisiana Governor Bobby 
Jindal, one of the phalanx of those campaigning for the 
Republican nomination for the presidency, chose in his first 
television ad to emphasize not only that "[i]f folks want to 
immigrate to America, they should do so legally. They should 
adopt our values. They should learn English .... " 34 
A distinctly more distinguished scholar, Samuel P. 
Huntington, published in 2004 as his last book Who Are We? The 
Challenges to America's National Identity that seemingly bought 
hook, line, and sinker the analysis offered in Federalist 2. Thus, 
wrote Huntington, 
[ t Jhe American people who achieved independence in the late 
eighteenth century were few and homogeneous: 
overwhelmingly white (thanks to the exclusion of blacks and 
Indians from citizenship), British, and Protestant, broadly 
sharing a common culture, and overwhelmingly committed to 
the political principles embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution, and other founding 
documents. 35 
Huntington despaired that this world was irredeemably lost. He 
was especially concerned by the increasing multilingualism 
generated primarily by the vast new numbers of Spanish-
speaking immigrants, who he feared were far less likely to leave 
their initial language than were Asians, another increasing part 
of the American mosaic. After writing that "No society is 
immortal," Huntington goes on to quote Rousseau: '"If Sparta 
and Rome perished, what state can hope to endure forever?'" 36 
Thus, Huntington suggested that we should not blithely assume 
that even the post-Civil War United States would maintain itself 
into the indefinite future. He explicitly rejected the wisdom of 
relying only on what might be termed "constitutional 
34. See James Hohmann, Jindal in his super PJ\Cs first ad: Immigrants 'should 
adopt our values... learn English', WASH. POST: POST POLITICS (J unc 2tJ, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonp(lst.com/news/post-politics/wpf2()J5/()6/2tJ/jindal-in-his-super-
pacs-first-ad-immigrants-should-adopt-our-valucslcarn-cnglish/ (which also contains a 
link to his video). 
35. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE'! THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S 
NATIONAL IDENTITY I I (2004). 
36. !d. 
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attachment," describing this as "the classic Enlightenment-
based, civic concept of a nation" in which "nationalism," lacking 
any other commonalities, was predicated entirely on 
commitment to abstract propositions. 37 "History and psychology, 
however, suggest that this is unlikely to be enough to sustain a 
nation for long. ,,x Instead, he called for renewed emphasis on 
the "core culture" that he believed dominated in 1787. 
One of the virtues of what I will call the "translation 
project," though, is to call into question what constituted even in 
1787, and even only among white males, the "core culture." No 
one could take seriously the assertion that Americans at the time 
shared a single religion, but at least we might think that Publius 
had gotten it right about it "speaking the same language." But 
now we know that was wrong as well. But so what? Perhaps his 
real mistake was not his altogether dubious reading of the 
American social order, but, rather, his belief, certainly shared 
with Franklin, that homogeneity really mattered. How might he 
have responded, for example, had Quebec accepted the 
invitation from American revolutionaries to join them as the 
"Fourteenth Colony" seeking independence from1 Great Britain 
in 1776.39 Quebec was as French speaking then- it had been 
seized by the British only in 1763 as part of the Seven Year's 
War-as it is now, and it would have been impossible to deny 
the multilinguicity of a United States that included Quebec. For 
better or, quite possibly, for worse, we did not have the 
opportunity in 1787 to come to terms with a robust form of 
heterogeneity that Quebec would have presented. 
In any event, I trust it is clear that there is n1uch reason to 
be grateful to Professor Mulligan and her associates. 
Professional linguists, theorists of interpretation, and American 
social historians all can benefit from their toiling in hitherto 
unknown and unexamined vineyards. 
:n. /d. at 1lJ. 
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3lJ. See MARK R. ANDFRSON, THE BATTLE FOR THE FOURTEENTH COLONY: 
AMERICA'S WAR OF LIBERATION IN CANADA, 1774-177() (2013). 
